Milley says he personally informed senior Trump officials of call with Chinese counterpart

Peril

During the hearing, McKenzie said that he recommended the US keep 2,500 troops in Afghanistan, a recommendation Milley said he agreed with. The testimony appears to contradict President Joe Biden’s claim to the contrary during an interview last month.

“I also had a view that the withdrawal of those forces would lead inevitably to the collapse of the Afghan military forces, and eventually the Afghan government,” McKenzie said.

Biden, when asked in an interview with ABC on August 18 interview if top military wanted him to keep about 2,500 troops in the country, said, “No, they didn’t. It was split … That wasn’t true.”

In his opening remarks, Milley specifically addressed new reporting in “Peril,” a book by Washington Post reporters Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, which details the military leader’s phone conversations to reassure a nervous Chinese general and his efforts to limit then-President Donald Trump from potentially ordering a dangerous military strike.

Milley’s actions, which were reported by CNN and others earlier this month ahead of the book’s release, spawned sharp criticism from Trump and his allies, including calls for Milley’s resignation and that he be tried for treason.

The timeline shows Milley talked with General Li Zuocheng in December 2019 and April 2020 as well as the October 2020 and January 2021 calls that had previously been reported.

The other memo submitted to Congress provides background information about Milley’s call with Hosue Speaker Nancy Pelosi on January 8, two days after the insurrection on Capitol Hill. The memo says that Milley “immediately informed” then-Acting Secretary of Defense Chris Miller about his call with Pelosi and seems to attribute any disparaging comments about the former President during the conversation to the House Speaker.

“At no time was I attempting to change or influence the process, usurp authority, or insert myself into the chain of command, but I am expected to give my advice and ensure the President is fully informed,” Milley said in the memo.

The memo with the timeline of calls between Chinese officials and DoD officials also provides relevant statutory guidance about the Chairman’s role in advising the President of the United States.

“Communication between the President or the Secretary (or their duly deputized alternates or successors) and the CCDRs ‘will be transmitted through the Chairman unless otherwise directed,'” the memo states.

‘We wanted to be ready and we were’

In his opening remarks, Austin emphasized the planning that preceded the evacuation from Afghanistan and the positioning of forces that allowed troops to arrive in Kabul fairly quickly as the evacuation began. As early as spring, the Pentagon began thinking about the possibility of a non-combatant evacuation and preparing for a number of scenarios, Austin said. By early June, Austin pre-positioned forces in the region, he said, including three infantry battalions.

“We wanted to be ready, and we were,” he said.

Although the first two days of the evacuation were “difficult,” Austin acknowledged, US troops restored order in 48 hours, and the herculean effort to move tens of thousands of American citizens and at-risk Afghans began in earnest.

“We are still working to get Americans out who wish to leave,” Austin said, though that is now the job of the State Department and the interagency, not the military. Lawmakers have repeatedly criticized the Biden administration for concluding the military evacuation and withdrawal from Afghanistan while there were still American citizens who wanted to leave the country. They have also criticized the administration’s inability to say just how many Americans are left in Afghanistan.

On Monday, a senior State Department official said the department is working to get out approximately 100 US citizens and Afghan Green Card holders from Afghanistan, but there was no indication of when that might happen or by what route they would leave the country.

“Even with no military presence on the ground, that part of our mission is not over,” Austin said.

Austin also defended the military’s decision to transfer Bagram Air Base to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, a move which quickly saw the sprawling base and hub of US operations fall to the Taliban. He said it would have required 5,000 troops to defend Bagram, and it would have “contributed little” to defending the embassy in Kabul about 30 miles away, which was initially the primary mission.

“Staying at Bagram, even for counter-terrorism purposes, meant staying at war in Afghanistan, something that the President made clear he would not do,” Austin said.

As he neared the end of his opening remarks, Austin shifted his focus to the entire 20-year war, asking if the US had the right strategy, if it believed falsely that it could build an Afghan government that would last, and if it could create a self-sustaining Afghan military. Austin admitted frankly that the US never understood the problems on the ground in Afghanistan, including endemic corruption that undermined and delegitimized the US-backed government. The collapse of the Afghan army in the face of a Taliban offensive “took us all by surprise,” Austin said.

“We helped build a state, but we could not forge a nation,” Austin said.

This story has been updated with additional developments.